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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to replicate
the theory developed by Gekker (2001),
without using any monotonicity
assumption. We however retain a
non-triviality assumption implicit in
Gekker (2001), which says that there
is at least one opportunity set which
is preferred to the no-choice situation.
In addition we require our preference
relation on opportunity sets to be
transitive (as in Gekker, 2001), reflexive
and satisfy an assumption called minimal
comparability, which requires every
opportunity set to be comparable with
the null set. We also show that there
exists a preference relation on the power
set of the set of alternatives, revealed by
a path independent choice function,
which satisfies all the properties that we
require of a binary relation to satisfy on






JEL classification C79, D71.1_ Introduction
The study of the problem of choosing
from non-empty subsets of a given
non-empty finite set, occupies a central
place in economic theory. The non-
empty subsets from which choices are
made are called opportunity sets.
There is a growing literature, which
studies preferences over opportunity
sets. A comprehensive survey of the
traditional developments can be
found in Barbera, Bossert and
Pattanaik (2002).
In recent papers, Vannucci
(2000) and Gekker (2001) provide
analyses of preferences over
opportunity sets in terms of the set of
filters that may be defined relative to
the preference. A filter is a non-empty
collection of opportunity sets, such
that, if an opportunity set belongs to
the filter, then so do all others, which
are at least as good as the given one.
We call such filters opportunity filters.
Gekker (2001), requires an assumption
called monotonicity, which says that any
opportunity set is at least as good as any
other that it contains. This, as recent
studies by Van Hees (1999) and Lahiri
(2001) point out, is often an untenable
assumption. The appearance of an
undesirable alternative in an
opportunity set, may render it less
acceptable than the opportunity set that
does not contain such alternatives
(or even the situation of not having
any alternatives to choose from, if the
undesirable alternative happens to be
particularly abhorring!), if one is not
guaranteed that in the subsequent act
of choice, one is free to discard
whatever alternatives one currently
dislikes. Further, it is often the case
that the choice of an opportunity
set is delegated to an individual who is
different from the individual who
would be choosing from the chosen
opportunity set, as for instance in
sequential decision making,
although the final act of choice affects
the individual responsible for choosing
the opportunity set. Thus if an
opportunity set contains an alternative
which its chooser intensely dislikes,
while the one responsible for choosing
from the opportunity set finds the
alternative highly desirable, then
anticipating what the final outcome
would be, the decision maker
responsible for choosing opportunity
sets would be better off by selecting
the opportunity set which does not
contain that alternative, while being
otherwise the same.
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Let X be a non-empty finite set of alternatives. Let P(X) denote the power set
of X, and [X] the set of all non-empty subsets of X. Let  b ear e f l e x i v ea n d
transitive binary relation on P(X) and let >, ~ denote its asymmetric and
symmetric parts respectively.
We assume that  satisfies the following two axioms:
_ Axiom N (Non-trivial): there exists A[X]: A > ;
_ Axiom MC (Minimal Comparability): for all AP(X), either A or A.
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The purpose of this paper is
to replicate the theory developed by
Gekker (2001), without using any
monotonicity assumption. We however
retain a non-triviality assumption
implicit in Gekker (2001) which says
that there is at least one opportunity set,
which is preferred to the no-choice
situation. In addition we require our
preference relation on opportunity sets
to be transitive (as in Gekker, 2001),
reflexive and satisfy an assumption
called minimal comparability, which
requires every opportunity set to be
comparable with the null set. Unlike
Gekker (2001), reflexivity does not
follow from any of the assumptions we
make. Reflexivity is definitely a less
demanding assumption than
monotonicity is. Further, the analysis in
Gekker (2001) does not require our
minimal comparability assumption
either. However, comparability of all
opportunity sets with the no choice
situation is not a very demanding
requirement. Along with transitivity, it
simply implies that an opportunity set
which is at least as good as the no
choice situation, is also at least as good
as any opportunity set which is no
better than the no choice situation.
In a final section of this paper,
we show that a preference relation on
the power set of the set of alternatives,
revealed by a path independent choice
function (Arrow, 1963 and Plott, 1973),
and which is similar to the one defined
by Johnson and Dean (2001) on the
range of a path independent choice
function, satisfies all the properties
that we require of a binary relation
to satisfy on the power set of the set of
alternatives. This shows that the context
of our analysis is non-vacuous.A non-empty subset  of [X] is said to be an opportunity filter with respect
to  if the following condition is satisfied: [B,A B] implies [A].
Let F() denote the set of opportunity filters with respect to .
Let  ()={ A [X]/A > }.
By Axiom N,  ()  . By the transitivity of ,[ B  (), A  B] implies [A ()].
Thus,     F( ).
3_ The set of opportunity filters with respect to a binary relation on P(X)
Lemma 1: Let 	 be a subset of [X] satisfying the following properties:
a. for all A, BP(X): [A	,B 
	] A>B ;
b. for all A, BP(X): [A
	,B 
	] A~B .
Then 	 = .
Proof:L e tA .T h u sA>.S i n c e	  [X], 
	.I fA 
	, then by (b),
A~, contradicting A > .T h u s ,A 	. Hence,   	.
Since   , it follows that 	  .
Now, suppose A	.S i n c e	  [X], 
	.B y( a ) ,A>.
Thus, A. Hence, 	   .
Thus, 	 = . Q.E.D.
Lemma 2: i. Let 	1, 	2F(). Then 	1 
	 2F();
ii. If 	F(), then 	 ();
iii. If 	1, 	2F()a n d	1 	 2  ,t h e n	1 	 2F().
Proof: (i) and (iii) are immediate from the definition of an opportunity filter with
respect to . Hence let us prove (ii). Let 	F() and towards a contradiction
suppose 	   . Thus, there exists A	\.B yA x i o mM C ,A.
Since 	F(), [A	 and A] implies [	], contradicting 	[X].
Thus, 	(). Q.E.D.
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opportunity filter with respect to  containing .( ) is called the opportunity
filter with respect to  containing .
Clearly ()={ A [X]/A  B for some B}. Denoting the latter set by ,
it is immediate from the definition of an opportunity filter that  is a subset
of any opportunity filter containing . Further, implies  . Also 
 ,
since B > , whenever B. By the transitivity of ,[ B ,A B] implies [A].
Thus, F(). Since,  is a subset of any opportunity filter containing , it must
be the case that  =( ). Note however that the requirement “let  be any
non-empty subset of )” cannot be replaced by “let  be any non-empty subset of
[X]”, as the following example reveals:
Exemple: Let X = {1, 2} and suppose {1, 2}~{1} > {2}~ .L e t = {{2}}.
Since {2}~ , and any opportunity filter is required to be a non-empty subset
of [X], there is no opportunity filter containing {2}.
Any non-empty subset of ) is called a base for an opportunity filter with
respect to .
Lemma 3:L e t and 	 be bases for opportunity filters with respect to .
i. 	implies ()  (	);
ii. if  is an opportunity filter then  =( );
iii. ()=
{(	)/	and 	 is a base for an opportunity filter with respect to };
iv. F()={ [X]/ is a base for an opportunity filter with respect
to  and  =[ ]}.
Proof: (i) and (ii) are immediate. (iii) follows from (i) and that  itself is a base for an
opportunity filter with respect to . (iv) follows from the fact that any opportunity
filter is also a base for itself. Q.E.D.
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implies A].
Proof: Suppose A  B>. Then clearly F()a n dB  implies A.
Now suppose B >  and not (A  B). Consider ({B}) = {C[X]/C  B}.
Clearly A
({B})F(), although B({B}). This proves the proposition. Q.E.D.
Proposition 2:L e tA ,B>.T h e nA B if and only if ({A})  ({B}).
Proof:I fA B>,t h e nA ({B})F(). Thus ({A})({B}).
Now suppose A, B >  and ({A})  ({B}). Since A({A}), we get A({B}).
Thus, A  B. Q.E.D.
Suppose there exists 	, F(), such that 	and 	 . Hence there
exists A	\ and B\	. Thus: [not (B  A) and not (A  B)]. Further, if there
exists A, B such that [not (B  A) and not (A  B)], then B
({A}) and
A
({B}). Thus we have proved the following:
Proposition 3: The following statements are equivalent:
i. for all A, B:e i t h e rA Bo rB A;
ii. for all 	, F(): either 	or 	 .
4_ The binary relation on P(X) defined by a non-empty subset of [X]
Let  denote the collection of all non-empty subsets of [X] and let G be any
non-empty subset of .G i v e nA ,B P(X), let A G B if and only if [for all G:
B implies A]. Let >G and ~G denote the asymmetric and symmetric parts
of G.L e t(G) = 
{/G}.
A G B, B G C implies:
i. for all G: B implies A;
ii. for all G: C implies B.
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Thus A G C. Thus, G is transitive.
Clearly, if A(G), then A >G .T h u s ,G satisfies Axiom N. Further,
A(G), BP(X)\(G) implies A >G  ~G B. Thus, G satisfies Axiom MC.
Proposition 4: F(G)={ 	 (G)/(i) 	 ; (ii) [B 	 , G B] implies A	} F.
Proof :L e t	F(G). Suppose, there exists A	 such that A
.T h u sA~ G
implies 	 contradicting 	F(G). Thus, 	F(G) implies 	 (G).
Since 	F(G), [B	, G B] implies A	.T h u s ,	F. Thus, F(G)  F.
Now, suppose 	F. Since 	 (G), 
	 .
Further, 	and [B	, G B] implies A	.T h u s ,	F(G). Thus, F  F(G).
Thus, F = F(G). Q.E.D.
5_ The Preference Revealed by a path independent choice function
Af u n c t i o nC :[ X ] [X] such that for all A[X]: C(A)  A, is called a choice
function. A choice function C is said to be Path Independent (PI)
if for all A, B [X]: C(A
B) = C(C(A)
C(B)).
A choice function C is said to be Indempotent if for all A[X]:
C(A) = C(C(A)).
Lemma 4: Let C be a PI choice function. Then C is Idempotent.
Proof: Let A[X]. Since C is PI, C(A) = C(A
C(A)) = C(C(A)
C(C(A)))
(by PI) = C(C(A)). Q.E.D.




Proof: Suppose C is PI and let A, B[X]. Then, A, B[X]:
C(A
C(B)) = C(C(A)
C(C(B))) (by PI) = C(C(A)
C(B))
(by Lemma 4) = C(A
B) (by PI).
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B) = C(A
C(B)). Let A, B[X].
T h u s ,A ,B [X]: C(A
B) = C(A
C(B)) = C(C(A)
C(B)). Thus, C is PI. Q.E.D.
Let C be a PI choice function. Let  be a binary relation on P(X)
defined as follows:
i. for all A[X] and BP(X), let A  B if and only if C(A
B) = C(A);
ii.  . Let > and ~ denote the asymmetric and symmetric parts
of  respectively.
Clearly, A > , whenever A[X]. Thus  satisfies both Axioms N and MC.
Further,  is reflexive. Let A, B, DP(X), with A  B  D. Since every element
of [X] is preferred to , we can without loss of generality assume A, B, D[X].
A  B implies C(A









(by Lemma 5) = C(A
C(B
D)) (by Lemma 5) = C(A
B) = C(A). Thus, A  D.
Hence, we have proved the following:
Proposition 5: Let C be a PI choice function. Let  b eab i n a r yr e l a t i o no nP ( X )
defined as follows:
i. for all A[X] and BP(X), let A  B if and only if C(A
B) = C(A);
ii.  .
Let > and ~ denote the asymmetric and symmetric parts of  respectively.
Then,  is reflexive, transitive and satisfies Axioms N and MC.
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6_Conclusion
It is perhaps true, that hidden in the
results obtained above are some basic
results on order filters of any finite
preordered set (not necessarily a power
set). The purpose of this paper is not to
claim originality as a contribution to the
theory of order filters, but to
characterize the concept of flexibility
that is embodied in a preference
relation on the set of opportunity sets,
in terms of a “decision theoretically”
plausible class of filters. Hence we call
all such filters opportunity filters. Thus,for instance in the case of a partially
ordered set, the empty set may be
included as an element of a filter.
In our definition of opportunity filters,
each of which is required to be a
non-empty collection of non-empty
subsets of a universal set, such a
possibility is ruled out. Since the empty
set corresponds to the theoretically
uninteresting case of a no choice
situation, including it in an opportunity
filter would lead to little if any value
addition to the results reported here.
While forfeiting a possible
opportunity to appeal to or replicate an
existing result in the theory of order
filters may be interpreted as a lack of
mathematical finesse, it definitely does
not impair the quality of our results
and presentation, which are mainly
decision theoretic. The fact that in our
chosen context our results can be
established in a self contained manner,
is in itself a vindication of the
framework and mode of analysis.
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